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NOTE
MONTAGUE V. STATE: FROM BARS TO BARS––A RIFF FOR
NARROW INTERPRETATION OF HIP-HOP LYRICS IN
CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS
MICHAEL A. GREGORY*
“Okay, the neighbors think I’m sellin’ dope. Hm, I guess the neighbors
think I’m sellin’ dope . . . Well motherf----r, I am. I am, I am, I am, I am.
Well motherf----r, I am.”1
These lyrics did not come to J. Cole, one of the most prominent hip-hop
artists of the 21st century, in a dream. Nor were they the product of any
subliminal inspiration. Instead, J. Cole wrote this song after his home was
raided by a S.W.A.T. team investigating a tip that he was illegally distributing
marijuana from his home studio.2 The officers found no illegal drugs and J.
Cole was not arrested.3 Surprisingly, though, J. Cole confessed to his
millions of fans and the entire world that he is, in fact, “sellin’ dope.” Yet J.
Cole has never been convicted of possession with the intent to distribute a
controlled substance or any other crime regarding the illegal distribution of
narcotics. Is there more than meets the eye with these lyrics? What about
others?
Long before J. Cole started his professional career, New York City
residents found themselves searching for new means of employment
following the economic decline of the 1970s.4 As local businesses shut down
and their employees lost their livelihoods, residents sought new forms of
entertainment into which they could escape.5 Combining the access to vacant
© 2022 Michael A. Gregory.
* J.D. Candidate, 2023, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law. The author
would like to thank the editors of the Maryland Law Review for their constant assistance and
dedication throughout the writing process. The author would also like to thank his parents, Victor
and Sharon, and brother, Ismail, for their unwavering support and encouragement. Finally, the
author is grateful for the invaluable insight and inspiration from Professor Christian Lassiter,
without which this Note would not have been possible.
1. J. COLE, Neighbors, on 4 YOUR EYEZ ONLY (Dreamville Records 2016).
2. Noah Yoo, J. Cole’s Studio Raided by SWAT Team in March, Producer Says, PITCHFORK
(Dec. 12, 2016), https://pitchfork.com/news/70391-j-coles-studio-raided-by-swat-team-in-march/.
3. Id.
4. Rory PQ, Hip Hop History: From the Streets to the Mainstream, ICON COLLECTIVE (Nov.
13, 2019), https://iconcollective.edu/hip-hop-history/.
5. Id.
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businesses, parking lots, and city streets with the desire for amusement, block
parties emerged.6 Not only would local residents gather to socialize at these
block parties, but the multicultural influences that accompanied them brought
together a clash of funk, soul, and disco music in a way that the world had
never seen before.7 The first MCs8 arose from this clash of cultures, fusing
these musical influences on turntables and soundboards to energize entire city
blocks.9 Later dubbed as hip-hop or rap music, artists like The Sugarhill
Gang and Kurtis Blow commercialized this newfound form of entertainment
by releasing songs that “talk[ed] and rhyme[d] over and in sync with the
music.”10
Hip-hop as a musical genre has proven its longevity by becoming an
integral part of American society. Hip-hop music has not only become an
avenue for musical entertainment on its face, but has also developed as a
means for self-expression.11 This artform is consistently raising cultural
awareness while communicating messages about social topics ranging from
violence to discrimination and everything in-between.12 Recently, hip-hop
music has become increasingly intertwined with criminal prosecutions, as
prosecutors have begun offering defendant-authored lyrics during criminal
trials as substantive evidence of guilt.13 Although the admissibility of
defendant-authored rap lyrics has been discussed by various state and federal
courts throughout the early 21st century, the Maryland Court of Appeals had

6. Id.
7. Id.
8. See MCing/Rapping, HIST. OF HIP HOP, https://historyofthehiphop.wordpress.com/hiphopcultures/mcingrapping/#:~:text=In%20hip%2Dhop%20music%2C%20an,entertained%20or%20to
%20glorify%20themselves (last visited Mar. 26, 2022) (“A Master of Ceremonies [MC] is the
official host of a staged event or similar performance. An MC usually presents performers, speaks
to the audience, entertains people, and generally keeps the event moving . . . In hip-hop music, an
MC . . . is a music artist and/or performer[] who usually creates and performs vocals for his/her own
original material. An MC uses rhyming verses, pre-written or ad lib (‘freestyled’), to introduce the
DJ with whom they work, to keep the crowd entertained or to glorify themselves.”).
9. PQ, supra note 4.
10. David Dye, The Birth of Rap: A Look Back, NPR (Feb. 22, 2007, 1:06 PM),
https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=7550286.
11. Ryan Hill, The influence of rap music in society, SPOKE (Apr. 23, 2020),
https://spokeonline.com/2020/04/the-influence-of-rap-music-in-society/.
12. Id.
13. See generally, e.g., Hannah v. State, 420 Md. 339, 23 A.3d 192 (2011); State v. Skinner, 95
A.3d 236 (N.J. 2014); State v. Cheeseboro, 552 S.E.2d 300 (S.C. 2001); Greene v. Commonwealth,
197 S.W.3d 76 (Ky. 2006); Holmes v. State, 306 P.3d 415 (Nev. 2013); United States v. Bey, No.
CR 16-290, 2017 WL 1547006 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 28, 2017); United States v. Stuckey, 253 F. App’x
463 (6th Cir. 2007).
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not directly addressed the issue until its precedential case in Montague v.
State14 in 2020.15
In Montague, the Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court’s admission of
defendant-authored lyrics as substantive evidence of a defendant’s guilt in a
murder trial, holding that the lyrics were both relevant to the alleged crime
and not unduly prejudicial.16 Specifically, the Court of Appeals held that the
lyrics bore a sufficiently close “factual and temporal nexus” to the details of
the alleged crime and that they retained heightened probative value sufficient
to outweigh any potential prejudice arising from the lyrics’ admission.17 The
lyrics played a significant role in proving the State’s case, as the only
additional evidence presented by the State was the testimony of one eyewitness,18 testimony establishing that the defendant lived near the scene of
the crime, inconclusive DNA evidence, and ambiguous surveillance
footage.19
This Note first argues in Section IV.A that the Court of Appeals erred
in Montague by affirming the admission of the lyrics at issue because the
lyrics were irrelevant. Specifically, the lyrics were identifiably distinct from
the details of the alleged crime and contained repeated references to general
rap music themes, rather than parallels to the alleged crime.20 Next,
acknowledging that the evidentiary threshold for relevance is low, Section
IV.B argues that any probative value contained within the lyrics was minimal
and substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice given the proven
psychological impact that violent lyrics have when presented to jurors in
criminal trials. Finally, Section IV.C suggests a framework that courts,
including the Court of Appeals, should employ when analyzing the
admissibility of defendant-authored lyrics in criminal trials to ensure that
their inherently prejudicial effects on jurors are mitigated. Such a framework
should include verifying the lyrics’ author, comparing the lyrics and alleged

14. 471 Md. 657, 243 A.3d 546 (2020).
15. The Court of Appeals has examined defendant-authored rap lyrics in the context of criminal
trials before, but only in the context of impeachment, which will be discussed later in this Note. See
Hannah, 420 Md. 339, 23 A.3d 192.
16. Montague, 471 Md. at 667, 243 A.3d at 552.
17. Id.
18. See infra Part I for a more detailed description of the eye-witness testimony that the trial
court relied upon.
19. In addition to the eye-witness testimony, the only additional witness testimony adduced at
trial was merely that the defendant lived at the apartment complex at which the shooting occurred.
Montague v. State, 244 Md. App. 24, 37, 222 A.3d 197, 204 (2019). Moreover, the State presented
a “limited amount of DNA evidence that was inconclusive,” and a video recording “that showed a
man in dark clothing running from the scene of the shooting.” Id.
20. See infra Section IV.A.
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crime for an unmistakable factual connection, and evaluating whether less
inherently prejudicial evidence is available.21
I.

THE CASE

On January 16, 2017, George Forrester and his cousin, Tracy Tasker,
drove to an apartment complex in Annapolis, MD, to purchase cocaine.22
After a short verbal exchange in the parking lot, a drug dealer entered the
apartment complex and returned moments later to sell Forrester and Tasker
cocaine.23 Forrester purchased the cocaine with a counterfeit $100 bill while
Tasker waited inside Forrester’s Ford Explorer SUV.24 The drug dealer
quickly realized that the $100 bill was counterfeit and, angered by the
perceived disrespect, pursued Forrester before “rais[ing] a firearm and
sho[oting] Mr. Forrester in the back.”25 Forrester later died from the injuries
sustained from the gunshot wound.26
Tasker was arrested two days after the shooting for unrelated warrants
and identified Lawrence Montague as Forrester’s assailant from a photograph
lineup during an interview with detectives.27 Tasker confirmed “that Mr.
Montague was the shooter because she knew him from two previous
encounters where she had bought drugs from him.”28 The police arrested
Montague nearly two weeks later and indicted him for Forrester’s murder.29
At Montague’s trial, Tasker further testified that both she and Montague were
incarcerated at the Jennifer Road Detention Center following their
independent arrests when “Montague recognized Ms. Tasker, [] looked
directly at her and called her a ‘f——n’ rat.’”30
On October 7, 2017, three weeks before his trial, Montague telephoned
an unidentified male from the Anne Arundel County Detention Center,
“request[ing] that the unidentified male record his rap lyrics.”31 The
unidentified male obliged, and the lyrics were as follows:
Listen, I said YSK / I ain’t never scared / I always let it spray /

21. See infra Section IV.C.
22. Montague v. State, 471 Md. 657, 667–68, 243 A.3d 546, 552 (2020).
23. Id. at 668, 243 A.3d at 552.
24. Id. at 667–68, 243 A.3d at 552.
25. Id. at 668, 243 A.3d at 552. Two .40 caliber shell casings and one spent bullet were
recovered at the scene. Id. at 669, 243 A.3d at 553.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 670, 243 A.3d at 553.
31. Id., 243 A.3d at 554.
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And, if a n—–a ever play / Treat his head like a target /
You know he’s dead today / I’m on his a-s like a Navy Seal /
Man, my n——s we ain’t never squeal /
I’ll pop your top like an orange peel / You know I’m from the streets /
F.T.G. / You know the gutter in me /
And I be always reppin’ my YSK s—t / Because I’m a king /
I be playin’ the block b—–h / And if you ever play with me /
I’ll give you a dream, a couple shots snitch /
It’s like hockey pucks the way I dish out this /
It’s a .40 when that b—–h goin’ hit up s—t / 4 or 5, rip up your body
quick /
Like a pickup truck / But you ain’t getting picked up /
You getting picked up by the ambulance /
You going to be dead on the spot /
I’ll be on your a-s.32
The State sought to introduce the phone recording and lyrics as evidence
of Montague’s guilt before the trial court.33 In response, “Montague moved
in limine34 to exclude the . . . recording of his rap lyrics because the lyrics
were ‘simply fiction’ and their prejudicial effect ‘far outweigh[ed]’ their
probative value.”35 Denying the motion, the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel
County “found that the rap lyrics . . . were relevant and admitted the
recording into evidence.”36 Montague was ultimately convicted and
sentenced to a thirty-year term of imprisonment for second-degree murder,
and to a consecutive twenty-year term of imprisonment for using a firearm
during the commission of a violent crime.37 The additional evidence at trial
established merely the cause of Forrester’s death, verified that Montague
lived in the apartment complex at which Forrester was murdered, identified
the shell casings recovered at the scene, and contained inconclusive DNA

32. Id. at 670–71, 243 A.3d at 554.
33. Id. at 671, 243 A.3d at 554.
34. See Prout v. State, 311 Md. 348, 356, 535 A.2d 445, 448 (1988) (“Typically, a motion in
limine is a motion made before or during a jury trial outside of the hearing of the jury, the purpose
of which is to prevent the jury from hearing certain questions and statements that are allegedly
prejudicial to the movant. Specifically, the motion usually seeks an order restricting opposing
counsel from offering questionable evidence before the judge has had an opportunity to rule on its
admissibility.”), overruled on other grounds by Beales v. State, 329 Md. 263, 619 A.2d 105 (1993).
35. Montague, 471 Md. at 671, 243 A.3d at 554.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 672, 243 A.3d at 554–55.
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and surveillance footage which showed only “a man in dark clothing running
from the scene of the shooting.”38
Montague appealed his convictions to the Court of Special Appeals,39
arguing that the trial court erred in admitting the rap lyrics as evidence.40
First, Montague contended that the lyrics were inadmissible under Maryland
Rules 5-40141 and 5-40242 “because they were so ‘ambiguous and equivocal’
that they provided the jury nothing more than fodder for speculation.”43
Alternatively, Montague asserted that admitting the lyrics “violated Md. Rule
5-403,44 which provides that even relevant evidence may be excluded ‘if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice.’”45 The Court of Special Appeals subsequently affirmed the
circuit court, holding that the lyrics were “a relevant statement of a party
opponent, whose probative value was not substantially outweighed by any
unfair prejudice caused by its admission.”46 According to the Court of
Special Appeals, the lyrics were relevant because “[t]hey tended to make it
more probable that Montague was Mr. Forrester’s killer.”47 Moreover, the
Court of Special Appeals found the lyrics more probative than prejudicial
because, “despite their ‘incendiary nature,’ the rap lyrics were strong
evidence as to ‘why the defendant was the person who committed the
particular crime charged.’”48 The Court of Appeals of Maryland granted
certiorari to address whether “artistic expression, in the form of rap lyrics,
that does not have a nexus to the alleged crime [is] relevant as substantive
evidence of a defendant’s guilt.”49
38. Id. Specifically, expert testimony established that the recovered shell casings were fired
from a .40 caliber firearm. Id., 243 A.3d at 554.
39. For a brief overview of the Maryland court structure, see Maryland’s Judicial System, MD.
COURTS,
https://www.courts.state.md.us/sites/default/files/import/publications/pdfs/mdjudicialsystem.pdf
(last visited Sept. 29, 2021).
40. Montague v. State, 244 Md. App. 24, 38, 222 A.3d 197, 205 (2019).
41. See MD. R. 5-401 (“‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence having any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less
probable than it would be without the evidence.”).
42. See MD. R. 5-402 (“Except as otherwise provided by constitutions, statutes, or these rules,
or by decisional law not inconsistent with these rules, all relevant evidence is admissible. Evidence
that is not relevant is not admissible.”) (emphasis added).
43. Montague, 244 Md. App. at 38, 222 A.3d at 205.
44. See MD. R. 5-403 (“Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading
the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence.”).
45. Montague, 244 Md. App. at 38–39, 222 A.3d at 205 (quoting MD. R. 5-403).
46. Id. at 39, 222 A.3d at 205
47. Id. at 48, 222 A.3d at 211.
48. Id. (quoting Smith v. State, 218 Md. App. 689, 705, 98 A.3d 444, 453 (2014)).
49. Montague v. State, 471 Md. 657, 673, 243 A.3d 546, 555 (2020).
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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Title 5 of the Maryland Rules, which governs the admissibility of
evidence at trials, was adopted to provide a comprehensive, efficient system
of standards that practitioners and courts could reference when analyzing
evidentiary matters.50 Maryland courts have long interpreted the evidentiary
standards set forth in Title 5 of the Maryland Rules, but have infrequently
applied those standards specifically to the admissibility of hip-hop and rap
lyrics in criminal trials.51 Section II.A describes the primary evidentiary rules
that Maryland courts have employed to interpret the admissibility of hip-hop
and rap lyrics in the limited number of times the issue has been presented.
Section II.B outlines the only published case in Maryland, other than the case
giving way to this Note, to conduct a substantive analysis of such lyrics’
admissibility under those rules. Section II.C then considers how various outof-state courts, many of which the majority in Montague relied on, have
analyzed the admissibility of lyrics in criminal trials. Finally, Section II.D
provides a brief overview of how federal courts have analyzed the
admissibility of rap lyrics given Title 5 of the Maryland Rules’ close overlap
with the Federal Rules of Evidence.
A. Maryland’s Evidentiary Rules Governing the Admissibility of Rap
Lyrics.
Under Maryland Rule 5-402,52 “in order for evidence to be admissible,
it must be relevant.”53 Maryland Rule 5-40154 provides that evidence is
relevant if it has “any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less

50. Alan D. Hornstein, The New Maryland Rules of Evidence: Survey, Analysis, and Critique,
54 MD. L. REV. 1032, 1033–34 (1995).
51. There are only two reported cases in Maryland that have expressly analyzed the
admissibility of rap lyrics under Maryland’s evidentiary rules: Hannah v. State, 420 Md. 339, 23
A.3d 192 (2011) (described in detail in Section II.B) and Montague v. State, 471 Md. 657, 243 A.3d
546 (2020) (the subject of this Note). There are, however, several unreported cases that have
conducted such an analysis. See Gregg v. State, No. 2307, Sept. Term, 2017, 2019 WL 2881528,
at *6 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. July 3, 2019) (affirming admission of rap lyrics because the lyrics were
“a literal statement of fact” and written “just hours after the [crime]”), cert. denied, 466 Md. 222,
217 A.3d 1134 (2019); Young v. State, No. 2540, Sept. Term, 2017, 2019 WL 2881380, at *8 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. July 3, 2019) (detailing same (companion case to Gregg)), cert. denied, 466 Md.
236, 217 A.3d 1141 (2019); Brown v. State, No. 1302, Sept. Term, 2013, 2016 WL 5720590, at *9
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. Sept. 30, 2016) (affirming admission of defendant’s lyrics referred to during
expert testimony because “the prejudicial impact of [impermissibly drawn inferences by the jurors]
was muted” by the trial court’s admission of the lyrics as the expert’s interpretation of the lyrics).
52. See supra note 42.
53. Thomas v. State, 429 Md. 85, 95, 55 A.3d 10, 16 (2012) (first citing Andrews v. State, 372
Md. 1, 19, 811 A.2d 282, 292 (2002); then citing MD. R. 5-402).
54. See supra note 41.
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probable than it would be without the evidence.”55 Put simply, “evidence
must tend to establish or refute a fact at issue in the case” to be relevant.56
Evidentiary relevance is a “relational concept,”57 meaning that “the test of
relevance is whether, in conjunction with all other relevant evidence, the
evidence tends to make the proposition asserted more or less probable.”58
Establishing relevance is a “very low bar to meet.”59
However, relevant evidence may nevertheless be excluded under
Maryland Rule 5-40360 “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice.”61 Unfair prejudice arises if the evidence
“might influence the jury to disregard the evidence or lack of evidence
regarding the particular crime with which [the defendant] is being charged.”62
Evidence’s probative value operates on a sliding scale in relation to its danger
to create unfair prejudice––the more probative value evidence has of the
alleged crime, the less likely it will be deemed unfairly prejudicial.63

55. Bryant v. State, 163 Md. App. 451, 490, 881 A.2d 669, 692 (2005) (quoting MD. R. 5-401),
aff’d, 393 Md. 196, 900 A.2d 227 (2006); see also FED. R. EVID. 401 (“Evidence is relevant if: (a)
it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and
(b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action.”).
56. Merzbacher v. State, 346 Md. 391, 404, 697 A.2d 432, 439 (1997); see also Paige v.
Manuzak, 57 Md. App. 621, 632, 471 A.2d 758, 763 (1984) (“Evidence is relevant if it is sufficiently
probative of a proposition that, if established, would have legal significance to the litigation.”).
57. Snyder v. State, 361 Md. 580, 591, 762 A.2d 125, 131 (2000).
58. Donati v. State, 215 Md. App. 686, 736, 84 A.3d 156, 185 (2014) (quoting Snyder, 361 Md.
at 592, 762 A.2d at 131).
59. Williams v. State, 457 Md. 551, 564, 179 A.3d 1006, 1013 (2018). See also Otto v. State,
459 Md. 423, 452, 187 A.3d 47, 64 (2018) (citations omitted) (“We have opined that having any
tendency to make any fact more or less probable, is a very low bar to meet.”).
60. See supra note 44.
61. Merzbacher, 346 Md. at 405, 697 A.2d at 439 (quoting Williams v. State, 342 Md. 724,
727, 679 A.2d 1106, 1113 (1996), overruled on other grounds by Wengert v. State, 364 Md. 76,
771 A.2d 389 (2001)); see also Burris v. State, 435 Md. 370, 392, 78 A.3d 371, 384 (2013) (“Having
determined the threshold for admissibility of [] evidence was met, however, does not end our
inquiry, as we still must determine whether the evidence should have been excluded because ‘its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice . . . .’” (quoting MD.
R. 5-403)). It is also worth noting that Maryland courts distinguish between the standards of review
applicable to certain evidentiary decisions. See, e.g., Vigna v. State, 470 Md. 418, 437, 235 A.3d
937, 947 (2020) (explaining that a trial court’s decision as to whether evidence is relevant is subject
to de novo review, whereas a trial court’s decision to admit relevant evidence is evaluated under an
abuse of discretion standard); Cf. Gordon v. State, 431 Md. 527, 535–36, 66 A.3d 647, 652 (2013)
(noting that “[w]hether evidence is hearsay is an issue of law reviewed de novo,” but “rulings on
the admissibility of evidence [are] ordinarily [reviewed] on an abuse of discretion standard”
(quoting Bernadyn v. State, 390 Md. 1, 7–8, 887 A.2d 602, 606 (2005))).
62. Burris, 435 Md. at 392, 78 A.3d at 384 (quoting Odum v. State, 412 Md. 593, 615, 989
A.2d 232, 245 (2010)).
63. See Odum, 412 Md. at 615, 989 A.2d at 245 (“The more probative the evidence is of the
crime charged, the less likely it is that the evidence will be unfairly prejudicial.”); see also Snyder
v. State, 361 Md. 580, 603, 762 A.2d 125, 138 (2000) (stating that admissible evidence must, among
other requirements, satisfy the “balancing requirement of Maryland Rule 5-403”).
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In addition to Maryland Rules 5-401 through 5-403, Maryland Rule 5404 is often discussed in evaluating the admissibility of defendant-authored
lyrics in criminal trials,64 as the Rule itself is “applicable only to evidence
offered by the State against the defendant in a criminal case.”65 Maryland
Rule 5-404 “limits the admissibility of evidence offered to prove criminal
propensity.”66 Specifically, it provides:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts . . . is not admissible to
prove the character of a person in order to show action in
conformity therewith. Such evidence, however, may be admissible
for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, common scheme or plan, knowledge, identity, or
absence of mistake or accident.67
Rule 5-404 bars the admission of evidence of a defendant’s prior acts or
character traits because it may lead a jury to conclude that a defendant is more
deserving of punishment and conviction given their past conduct, regardless
of whether they actually committed the crime in question at the current trial.68
In short, “evidence is inadmissible [under Rule 5-404] if offered for the
purpose of proving criminal propensity.”69
B. In-State Application of Maryland’s Evidentiary Rules to the
Admissibility of Rap Lyrics
In Maryland, the Court of Appeals’ decision in Hannah v. State70 set the
framework for applying the above-described Maryland Rules to determining

64. As noted previously, although the Court of Appeals has infrequently analyzed the
admissibility of rap and hip-hop lyrics in criminal trials, there have been various unreported
decisions in Maryland that have conducted such an analysis. See supra note 51.
65. Ruffin Hotel Corp. of Md. v. Gasper, 418 Md. 594, 625, 17 A.3d 676, 694 (2011).
66. Snyder, 361 Md. at 602, 762 A.2d at 137.
67. MD. R. 5-404(b); see also MD. R. 5-404(a)(1) (specifying that, subject to certain limitations,
“evidence of a person’s character or character trait is not admissible to prove that the person acted
in accordance with the character or trait on a particular occasion”).
68. See Hurst v. State, 400 Md. 397, 407, 929 A.2d 157, 162 (2007) (“Propensity evidence, or
evidence suggesting that because the defendant is a person of criminal character it is more probable
that he committed the crime for which he is on trial, is not admissible into evidence. . . . The primary
concern underlying the Rule is a ‘fear that jurors will conclude from evidence of other bad acts that
the defendant is a “bad person” and should therefore be convicted, or deserves punishment for other
bad conduct and so may be convicted even though the evidence is lacking.’” (quoting Harris v.
State, 324 Md. 490, 496, 597 A.2d 956, 960 (1991))). But see Donati v. State, 215 Md. App. 686,
738, 84 A.3d 156, 186–87 (2014) (citations omitted) (explaining that propensity evidence may be
admissible, “however, if the evidence has special relevance, i.e. is substantially relevant to some
contested issue in the case and is not offered simply to prove criminal character”).
69. Snyder, 361 Md. at 602, 762 A.2d at 137.
70. 420 Md. 339, 23 A.3d 192 (2011).
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the admissibility of defendant-authored rap lyrics.71 In Hannah, the Court of
Appeals held that the trial court erred in admitting rap lyrics as impeachment
evidence during the State’s cross-examination of the defendant because the
lyrics had little purpose other than to show that the defendant had a propensity
for violence.72 As the suspect in a drive-by shooting, charged with attempted
murder, the defendant in Hannah was asked on direct examination whether
he ever possessed, held, fired, or had access to a gun on the day of the
shooting.73 The defendant answered every question in the negative, and the
State sought to introduce a composition book into evidence that contained
the following lyrics written by the defendant two years prior to the shooting:
One, two three, shot ya a-s just got drop / I ain’t got guns, got a duz unda
da seat /
Ya see da tinted cum down n out come da glock /
Ya just got jacked, we leave da scene in da lime green /
So you betta step ta me before I blow you off ya feet /
Bring da whole click, we put em permanently sleep /
Wa you think, I ain’t got burners, got a duz unda da seat /
Ya talk a bunch s—t n ya sure . . . So pull your f——n trigga n—–a go
pop, pop, one, two three shot ya a-s jus got drop / I’ll put you in a funeral.74
The State’s attorney then proceeded to read each lyric line by line,
asking the defendant if he had written them.75 The Court of Appeals
ultimately concluded that this line of questioning, and the rap lyrics
themselves, unfairly prejudiced the defendant.76 The court drew a distinction
between “admissible statements of historical fact [and] inadmissible works
of fiction.”77 Specifically, the court held that the lyrics “were probative of
no issue other than the issue of whether he has a propensity for violence”
considering the lack of a factual or temporal connection between the lyrics
and the alleged crime.78

71. See Montague v. State, 471 Md. 657, 676, 243 A.3d 546, 557 (2020) (explaining that
“Hannah provides us with a guidepost” regarding “the relevance of rap lyrics and the prejudicial
effect that often accompanies their admission”).
72. Hannah, 420 Md. at 355, 23 A.3d at 201.
73. Id. at 343–44, 23 A.3d at 194.
74. Id. at 345–46, 23 A.3d at 195–96.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 355, 23 A.3d at 201.
77. Id. at 348, 23 A.3d at 197.
78. Id. at 355, 23 A.3d at 201.
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C. Out-of-State Interpretations Regarding the Admissibility of Rap
Lyrics
Although Hannah provided valuable insight regarding rap lyrics’
admissibility in the context of criminal trials, Hannah did not directly address
the admissibility of defendant-authored lyrics outside the impeachment
context.79 However, various courts in other jurisdictions have applied similar
reasoning as Hannah to evaluate the admissibility of defendant-authored rap
lyrics.80 In State v. Skinner,81 the Supreme Court of New Jersey affirmed the
reversal of a defendant’s conviction, based in part on the trial court’s
erroneous admission of the defendant’s rap lyrics,82 because there was no
“strong nexus between specific details of the artistic composition and the
circumstances of the offense.”83 Specifically, the court concluded that
“[s]elf-expressive fictional, poetic, lyrical, and like writings about bad acts,
wrongful acts, or crimes generally should not be deemed evidential unless
the writing bears probative value to the underlying offense for which a person
is charged.”84 The Supreme Court of New Jersey further explained that the
probative value of that evidence must outweigh the “likelihood of poisoning
the jury against defendant.”85
In Skinner, the defendant was charged with various counts of attempted
murder, conspiracy, unlawful possession of a firearm, and aggravated assault
after allegedly luring an individual to a park and shooting him.86 The victim
was found with eight bullet holes in his body: three in his back, one in his left
arm, one in his chest, one on his upper abdomen, and two in his head.87 The
79. See Montague v. State, 471 Md. 657, 676, 243 A.3d 546, 557 (2020) (“As the Court of
Special Appeals aptly noted below . . . Hannah involves the admissibility of rap lyrics in the
impeachment context—rather than as substantive evidence of a defendant’s guilt—and is not
entirely analogous to the context of this case.”).
80. See id. (noting that the “Court of Special Appeals shaped much of its analysis [in Montague
v. State, 244 Md. App. 24, 222 A.3d 197 (2019)] by surveying several out-of-state decisions—some
of which guided this Court’s analysis in Hannah”).
81. 95 A.3d 236 (N.J. 2014).
82. Notably, the standard of review for reversing a trial court’s evidentiary ruling in New Jersey
is the same as Maryland’s. Compare State v. Medina, 231 A.3d 689, 698 (N.J. 2020) (citations
omitted) (“[W]e review a trial court’s evidentiary ruling only for a clear error in judgment. We do
not substitute our own judgment for the trial court’s unless its ruling was so wide of the mark that a
manifest denial of justice resulted.”), with Dehn v. Edgecombe, 384 Md. 606, 628, 865 A.2d 603,
616 (2005) (explaining that in order to reverse a trial court’s evidentiary rulings, “[t]he decision
under consideration has to be well removed from any center mark imagined by the reviewing court
and beyond the fringe of what that court deems minimally acceptable” (quoting North v. North, 102
Md. App. 1, 13–14, 648 A.2d 1025, 1031–32 (1994))).
83. Skinner, 95 A.3d at 251–52.
84. Id. at 253.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 240.
87. Id. at 239.
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police obtained a search warrant for the defendant’s vehicle after the victim
identified the defendant as the assailant.88 The police then executed the
search warrant and found “three notebooks filled with rap lyrics authored by
[the] defendant,” which contained, among others, the following lyrics that
the prosecution attempted to admit as evidence: “Got Beef, I can spit from a
distance for instance; a [person] wouldn’t listen so I hit him with the
Smithern; hauled off 15 rounds, seven missed him; Two to the mask and six
to the ribs, lifted and flipped him.”89
The Supreme Court of New Jersey ultimately concluded that these lyrics
bore no specific nexus to the facts of the crime, despite its arguable parallels
to the circumstances surrounding the shooting—specifically, the similarities
of the specific number of times and where in his body the deceased was
shot—because “there was no evidence to suggest that [the defendant’s]
writing was anything other than fiction.”90 The court emphasized that
admitting the lyrics was therefore unfairly prejudicial because it would cause
the jury to speculate that the defendant committed the crimes notwithstanding
the lack of an “unmistakable factual connection to the charged crimes.”91
Moreover, the court “detect[ed] little to no probative value to the lyrics
whatsoever” and accordingly “reject[ed] the proposition that probative
evidence about a charged offense can be found in an individual’s artistic
endeavors absent a strong nexus between [the artistic composition and the
details of the crime].”92 In doing so, the Supreme Court of New Jersey
concluded that a trial court’s admission of defendant-authored lyrics
constitutes an abuse of discretion when it admits “highly prejudicial [lyrics]”
that bear “little or no probative value.”93
In State v. Cheeseboro,94 the Supreme Court of South Carolina held that
the trial court erred in admitting unfairly prejudicial rap lyrics written by the
defendant from his jail cell while awaiting trial.95 Similar to Hannah and
88. Id. at 239–40.
89. Id. at 240, 251. See id. at 241–42 for a full recitation of the lyrics that the State drew
attention to throughout the trial, which the court characterized as “replete with expletives and
included graphic depictions of violence, bloodshed, death, maiming, and dismemberment.” Id. at
241.
90. Id. at 251. Specifically, the court noted that although the lyrics “describe[] a shooting
resembling [the decedent’s] in that it involved multiple gun shots delivered to the head, ‘the mask,’
[] chest, [and] ‘the ribs,’ . . . The jurors were left to speculate that defendant had done such things
. . . .” Id.
91. Id. at 252 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court of New Jersey also noted that “it [was]
not clear when each individual verse of the lyrics . . . was written.” Id. at 240.
92. Id. at 251–52.
93. Id. at 253.
94. 552 S.E.2d 300 (S.C. 2001).
95. Id. at 313. See id. at 312 for the full text of the defendant’s lyrics, which included the
following text:
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Skinner, the court concluded that the lyrics presented “unfair prejudicial
impact as evidence of [the defendant’s] bad character, i.e. his propensity for
violence in general,” because the lyrics contained only “general references
glorifying violence” rather than “details of the crimes committed.”96
Although the lyrics contained references to events and conditions similar to
the alleged crime, the court found that the references were “too vague in
context to support the admission of this evidence.”97 Just like the Supreme
Court of New Jersey in Skinner, the Supreme Court of South Carolina
concluded in Cheeseboro that the trial court erred in admitting the rap lyrics
despite the great amount of deference owed to the trial court’s evidentiary
rulings.98
On the other hand, various courts have applied the above-described
principles to conclude that defendant-authored rap lyrics were admissible.
For example, in Greene v. Commonwealth,99 the Supreme Court of Kentucky
analyzed whether the following defendant-authored lyrics, written while the
defendant was awaiting trial for murdering his wife, were properly admitted
as evidence:
B—–h made me mad, and I had to take her life /
My name is Dennis Greene and I ain’t got no f——g wife /
I knew I was gonna be givin’ it to her . . . when I got home /
I cut her mother——n’ neck with a sword /
I’m sittin’ in the cell starin’ at four walls.100
The Supreme Court of Kentucky concluded that these lyrics were
admissible, despite their tendency to prove a “criminal disposition,” due in
part to the fact that the lyrics referred directly to the defendant’s actions
Like the 4th of July, I spray fire in the sky. If I hear your voice, better run like horses or
like metamorphis, turn all y’all to corpses. No fingerprints or evidence at your residence.
Fools leave clues, all I leave is a blood pool. Ten murder cases, why the sad faces? Cause
when I skipped town, I left a trail [of] bodies on the ground.
96. Id. at 313.
97. See id. (referring to the “song’s reference to leaving no prints and bodies left in a pool of
blood”). This is especially noteworthy because the facts underlying the alleged crime showed that
three victims were lying in a pool of blood after being shot in a barbershop; however, the court still
found these lyrics to be too vague to outweigh the prejudicial impact the violent lyrics would have
on the jury. Id.
98. Id. See State v. Cross, 832 S.E.2d 281, 285 (S.C. 2019) (“The appellate court reviews a
trial [court’s] ruling on admissibility of evidence pursuant to an abuse of discretion standard and
gives great deference to the trial court.” (quoting State v. Torres, 703 S.E.2d 226, 230 (S.C. 2010))).
However, the Cheeseboro court did note that there was harmless error in the admission.
Cheeseboro, 552 S.E.2d at 313.
99. 197 S.W.3d 76 (Ky. 2006).
100. Id. at 86.
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regarding the crime.101 Specifically, the court relied on testimony
establishing that the defendant told his co-worker, “I’m going to do it. I’m
going to kill her,” hours before the defendant slit his wife’s throat following
a domestic argument.102 Drawing attention to the temporal aspect of the
lyrics, the court also noted that the lyrics shed light on the defendant’s
culpability because they were created by the defendant just days after the
murder.103
The Supreme Court of Nevada reached a similar conclusion in Holmes
v. State,104 where that court held defendant-authored rap lyrics to be
admissible despite similar arguments that the lyrics “carrie[d] the risk of . . .
being misunderstood or misused [by the jury] as criminal propensity or ‘bad
act’ evidence.”105 In Holmes, the defendant was charged and convicted of
murder and robbery after “[t]wo men wearing ski masks” killed a drug dealer
in a recording studio parking lot before stealing his chain necklace.106 While
the defendant was in jail awaiting trial, he wrote the following rap stanza:
But now I’m uh big dog, my static is real large /
Uh neighborhood super star. Man I push uh hard line /
My attitude s——y n—–a you don’t want to test this /
I catching slipping at the club and jack you for your necklace /
F—k parking lot pimping. Man I’m parking lot jacking, running
through your pockets with uh ski mask on straight laughing.107
Comparing the facts of the murder to the lyrics, the court found that the
lyrics’ probative value outweighed any concern that they were unfairly
prejudicial because the “lyrics describe[d] details that mirror[ed] the crime
charged.”108 With respect to the factual similarities between the lyrics and
the crime, the court concluded that “[t]he lyrics’ reference to ‘jack[ing] you
for your necklace’ may fairly refer to [the defendant] stealing [the victim’s]
chain necklace during the robbery.”109 The court also acknowledged that the
lyrics “discuss ski masks, a parking-lot jacking of a ‘drug-deala,’ and
emptying a victim’s pockets.”110 Although the court noted that “lyrics’ lack
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id. at 87.
Id. at 79–80.
Id. at 86.
306 P.3d 415 (Nev. 2013).
Id. at 418.
Id. at 417.
Id. at 418.
Id. at 419.
Id. at 419–20.
Id. at 420.
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of originality may reduce” the lyrics’ probative value, the court held that the
close factual and temporal111 nexus between the lyrics and the crime was
sufficient to overcome the “risk of misinterpretation and [unfair]
prejudice.”112
The above cases demonstrate that courts across the nation typically rely
on a core set of principles when determining the admissibility of defendantauthored lyrics. Cases like Greene and Holmes highlight that defendantauthored lyrics are admissible when they bear such a striking resemblance to
the details of an alleged crime that they can be said to “mirror the crime
charged.”113 In such cases, a strong factual and temporal connection between
the lyrics and the alleged crime gives the lyrics heightened probative value
that is unlikely to be outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice.114 On the
other hand, cases like Skinner and Cheeseboro highlight that courts are
reluctant to admit defendant-authored lyrics into evidence where they merely
share commonalities with the details of an alleged crime rather than
exhibiting an “unmistakable” factual and temporal connection.115 Moreover,
state appellate courts do not hesitate to reverse the admission of defendantauthored lyrics as an abuse of discretion where no such unmistakable
connection exists.116
D. Federal Court Interpretations Regarding the Admissibility of Rap
Lyrics
Further surveying federal cases sheds light on the admissibility of
defendant-authored rap lyrics given that Maryland’s evidentiary rules are
derived from and “[m]odeled after the Federal Rules of Evidence.”117 Not
surprisingly, the state of federal case law on the admissibility of defendant-

111. The court did not explicitly identify when the lyrics were composed, but did identify that
its decision was based in part on “the timing of the composition after [the defendant’s] arrest.” Id.
112. Id. at 419–20.
113. Id. at 419; see also Greene v. Commonwealth, 197 S.W.3d 76 (Ky. 2006).
114. See generally Greene, 197 S.W.3d 76; Holmes, 306 P.3d 415.
115. State v. Skinner, 95 A.3d 236, 252 (N.J. 2014); see also State v. Cheeseboro, 552 S.E.2d
300 (S.C. 2001).
116. See supra notes 90–98 and accompanying text.
117. Graves v. State, 344 Md. 30, 36 n.2, 637 A.2d 1197, 1201 n.2 (1994); see also, e.g., Brooks
v. State, 439 Md. 698, 721 n.10, 98 A.3d 236, 249 n.10 (2014) (“In creating Title 5 of the Maryland
Rules of Practice and Procedure in 1994 and adopting [the] Maryland Rules of Evidence, the drafters
used the Federal Rules of Evidence as a starting point.”); Stoddard v. State, 389 Md. 681, 693, 887
A.2d 564, 571 (2005) (explaining that numerous states, including Maryland, adopted “substantially
similar” evidentiary rules to the Federal Rules of Evidence); Lynn McLain, Maryland’s Adoption
of
a
Code
of
Evidence
(1994),
https://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1888&context=all_fac (“With the
Court of Appeals’ adoption of Title 5 [of the Maryland Rules] . . . Maryland became the thirtyeighth state to adopt a code of evidence derived from the Federal Rules of Evidence . . . .”).
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authored lyrics with reference to the Federal Rules of Evidence is similar to
that of the state law decisions explained above.118 For example, in United
States v. Bey,119 the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania found that defendant-authored rap lyrics were inadmissible
because their “probative value [was] substantially outweighed by the danger
of unfair prejudice under Rule 403.”120 In Bey, the defendant was charged
with being a felon in possession of a firearm.121 The Government sought to
admit the following rap lyrics composed by the defendant:
[S]mall Glock in my pocket /
I feel that steel /
When you see me I’m strapped under my garments. Packin’ pistols in
Porsches /
Where I’m from we don’t miss . . . play with heavy Tommy guns like
John Dillinger /
No disrespect to Jews but I move with the Uz /
I’m warning ya / go and ask Jay Electronica / 23rd and Tasker, blast you
in your yarmulke.122
The Government argued that the lyrics had “high probative value” and
were relevant because the lyrics demonstrated that the defendant carried
concealed firearms, similar to the charged offense.123 The court rejected this
argument.124 Specifically, the court explained that rap lyrics “are not
necessarily autobiographical statements; rather, rap music is a wellrecognized musical genre that often utilizes exaggeration, metaphor, and
braggadocio for the purpose of artistic expression.”125 Moreover, the court
noted that the Government failed to demonstrate a direct factual connection
between the lyrics and the alleged offense beyond mere “fictional imagery,
metaphors, and exaggerated storylines.”126 Drawing attention to the temporal
118. See supra notes 113–116 and accompanying text.
119. No. CR 16-290, 2017 WL 1547006 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 28, 2017).
120. Id. at *8. See FED. R. EVID. 403 (“The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice,
confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting
cumulative evidence.”).
121. Bey, 2017 WL 1547006, at *1.
122. Id. at *6.
123. Id.
124. See id. (“Viewed in their broader artistic context, the rap music evidence does not have a
high probative value.”).
125. Id. The court also noted that “[b]ecause rap lyrics may falsely or inaccurately depict reallife events, they should not necessarily be understood as autobiographical statements.” Id.
126. Id.
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aspect of the lyrics, the court emphasized that “the probative value of the . . .
lyrics [was] further undercut by the fact that they are undated, so there is no
indication as to whether [the defendant] created the lyrics close in time to the
date of his arrest.”127 Finally, the court found that the probative value was
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice because
“[a]dmitting [the lyrics] into evidence present[ed] a serious risk of inflaming
the jurors and influencing them to convict [the defendant] on impermissible
grounds.”128 Bey provides a useful framework for analyzing the admissibility
of defendant-authored lyrics that is consistent with the state appellate
decisions above and endorsed by federal appellate courts.129
Conversely, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held in United States v.
Stuckey130 that defendant-authored rap lyrics were admissible despite
arguments that the lyrics were irrelevant, improper character evidence, and
unfairly prejudicial.131 In Stuckey, the defendant was charged and convicted
of, among other things, murdering a federal informant.132 The Government
alleged that the defendant shot an individual eleven times before wrapping
the individual in blankets and dumping the body in a nearby alley.133 After
obtaining and executing a search warrant for the defendant’s apartment,
police officers confiscated a blue backpack from the trunk of the defendant’s
vehicle located in his garage.134 The officers searched the backpack and
found the following “handwritten rap lyrics” which the trial court admitted
into evidence: “I expose those who knows; Fill they body wit ho[l]es; Rap
em up in blankit; Dump they bodys on the rode.”135
On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court should have
excluded the lyrics because they were “irrelevant, improper evidence of prior
127. Id. at *7.
128. Id. (citing United States v. Sriyuth, 98 F.3d 739, 748 (3d Cir. 1996)). The court supported
this conclusion by highlighting that the lyrics bore no direct connection to the offense, and “the
lyrics at issue contain[ed] language and imagery related to drugs, gun crime, violence based on
religion, and other potentially offensive themes.” Id.
129. See, e.g., United States v. Gamory, 635 F.3d 480, 492–94 (11th Cir. 2011) (holding that the
trial court erred in admitting defendant-authored rap lyrics since the lyrics “presented a substantial
danger of unfair prejudice because they contained violence, profanity . . . and could reasonably be
understood as promoting a violent and unlawful lifestyle” and were “not clearly probative of [the
defendant’s] guilt”). Similar to the state court decisions described in Section II.C, federal appellate
courts have thus found that admitting lyrics with little probative value in light of their highly
prejudicial effects constitutes an abuse of discretion. See General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136,
141 (1997) (citing Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 174 n.1 (1997)) (“We have held that
abuse of discretion is the proper standard of review of a district court’s evidentiary rulings.”).
130. 253 F. App’x 468 (6th Cir. 2007).
131. Id. at 482–83.
132. Id. at 473.
133. Id. at 474–75. The Government alleged these facts based on the eye-witness testimony. Id.
134. Id. at 477.
135. Id. at 475, 477.
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bad acts, and substantially more prejudicial than probative.”136 First,
addressing the lyrics’ relevance, the Sixth Circuit concluded that the lyrics
were relevant because they depicted “precisely what the Government accused
[the defendant] of doing.”137 Next, addressing the argument that the lyrics
were impermissible character evidence, the Sixth Circuit held that the lyrics
were introduced to show the factual similarities between the lyrics and the
crime rather than the defendant’s propensity for violence, and reiterated that
the lyrics “provide[d] direct evidence” that the defendant committed the
alleged crime.138 Finally, the court noted that the lyrics were not unfairly
prejudicial given their strong factual nexus to the details of the crime.139
Against this backdrop of cases and many others,140 the Court of Appeals of
Maryland in Montague v. State addressed whether a defendant’s artistic
expression, “in the form of rap lyrics,” bore a sufficient nexus to the alleged
crime such that the rap lyrics were relevant and not outweighed by unfair
prejudice.141
III. THE COURT’S REASONING
In Montague v. State, the Maryland Court of Appeals held that (1)
“defendant-authored rap lyrics [that] bear a close nexus to the details of an
alleged crime such that the lyrics constitute ‘direct proof’ of the defendant’s
involvement” are admissible under the Maryland Rules, and (2) “when such
a nexus exists, the probative value of defendant-authored rap lyrics is not
substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice because the usefulness of the

136. Id. at 482.
137. Id. (emphasis added).
138. Id.
139. See id. at 483 (“[T]he district court admitted [the defendant’s] rap lyrics, not as fiction, but
as fact—autobiographical statements of acts relevant to the case.”). Assuming that the lyrics would
not unduly influence a jury, the Sixth Circuit further stated that “[r]ap is no longer an underground
phenomenon and is a mainstream music genre. Reasonable jurors would be unlikely to reason that
a rapper is violent simply because he raps about violence.” Id. at 484.
140. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Gray, 978 N.E.2d 543, 560–62 (Mass. 2012) (holding
admission of rap video and lyrics was prejudicial error because “[t]he lyrics show[ed] no connection
to the defendant that would suggest they were biographical,” and their “prejudicial effect was
overwhelming”); State v. Hanson, 731 P.2d 1140, 1144 n.7, 1145 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987) (holding
that admission of defendant-authored lyrics was reversible error where “the State never indicated
how the defendant’s writings were logically relevant,” like showing “that [the defendant] wrote
about an incident so similar to the crime charged”); Daniels v. Lewis, No. C 10-04032 JSW, 2013
WL 183968, at *12 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 17, 2013) (admitting lyrics “because they constitute[d] direct
evidence of [defendant’s] involvement in the crimes charged”); see generally Jason B. Binimow,
Admissibility of Rap Lyrics or Videos in Criminal Prosecutions, 43 A.L.R. 7th Art. 1 (2019)
(collecting cases).
141. 471 Md. 657, 673, 243 A.3d 546, 555 (2020).
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lyrics to the jury is not substantially overcome by their inflammatory
character as propensity evidence.”142
First addressing Montague’s relevancy argument,143 the Court of
Appeals identified that “[h]aving ‘any tendency’ to make ‘any fact’ more or
less probable is a very low bar to meet.”144 The majority then held that
Montague’s lyrics were relevant because they bore “a close factual and
temporal nexus to the details of Mr. Forrester’s murder.”145 The majority
attempted to equate Montague’s vague lyrics with the details of Forrester’s
murder by analyzing the plain language of the verses and looking for
similarities to the murder itself.146 For instance, the court credited the first
verse147 of Montague’s lyrics as a reference to Forrester’s attempt to trick
Montague by purchasing cocaine with counterfeit money.148 The majority
then likened the next two verses of Montague’s lyrics to Montague shooting
Forrester for attempting to do so.149
Additionally, the majority relied on the fact that “[s]hortly after Mr.
Forrester ‘played’ Mr. Montague, he was shot to death—just as the lyrics
recount.”150 Bringing attention to the inconclusive evidence recovered at the
scene, the majority analogized that “a ‘.40,’ in the context of Mr. Montague’s
rap lyrics, is shorthand for a .40-caliber handgun,” similar to the .40 caliber
shell casings found by the police at the scene of Forrester’s murder.151
Finally, the majority assigned the lyrics “heightened probative value”
because they included a broad “snitching” reference,152 which the majority
associated with Montague calling Tasker a “f——n’ rat.”153
Aside from the fleeting comparisons between the language of
Montague’s lyrics and the details of Forrester’s murder, the majority also
concluded that “the probative value of Mr. Montague’s rap lyrics is

142. Id. at 691, 243 A.3d at 566 (citing Holmes v. State, 306 P.3d 415, 420 (Nev. 2013)).
143. See supra notes 39–43 and accompanying text.
144. Montague, 471 Md. at 674, 243 A.3d at 556 (citing Williams v. State, 457 Md. 551, 564,
179 A.3d 1006, 1013 (2018) (quoting MD. R. 5-401)).
145. Id. at 692, 243 A.3d at 566.
146. Id. at 692–93, 243 A.3d at 566–67.
147. See id. at 670–71, 243 A.3d at 554 (referring to the following lyrics from Montague’s rap:
“And, if a n—-a ever play / Treat his head like a target / You know he’s dead today”).
148. See id. at 692, 243 A.3d at 566–67 (“The first verse is a reference to Mr. Forrester’s attempt
to ‘play,’ or cheat, Mr. Montague by purchasing cocaine using counterfeit money.”).
149. See id. at 692–93, 243 A.3d at 567 (“The next two verses are an acknowledgement that Mr.
Montague shot at Mr. Forrester, as if he were ‘a target,’ for trying to ‘play’ him during the drug
transaction.”).
150. Id. at 693, 243 A.3d at 567.
151. Id.
152. See id. at 671, 243 A.3d at 554 (referencing the following lyrics from Montague’s rap: “I’ll
give you a dream, a couple shots snitch”).
153. Id. at 694, 243 A.3d at 567.
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compounded by a close temporal nexus to Mr. Forrester’s murder.”154
Specifically, the majority likened Montague’s lyrics to those at issue in
Greene v. Commonwealth and Holmes v. State merely because they were
recorded “less than a year after the murder occurred and three weeks before
trial.”155 “Because Mr. Montague’s lyrics were composed after Mr.
Forrester’s murder,” the majority reasoned, “their close temporal nexus to the
crime furthers their probative value as substantive evidence of his guilt.”156
Second, addressing whether the lyrics were substantially more
prejudicial than probative,157 the majority acknowledged that “[w]hile rap
lyric evidence often has prejudicial effect as improper propensity evidence of
a defendant’s bad character, those concerns are diminished when the lyrics
are so akin to the alleged crime that they serve as ‘direct proof’ of the
defendant’s involvement.”158 The majority also noted that “[t]o reverse the
trial judge’s decision to admit Mr. Montague’s rap lyrics, that decision must
be ‘well removed from any center mark imagined by the reviewing court and
beyond the fringe of what that court deems minimally acceptable.’”159
Taking into account the above analysis regarding the probative value of the
lyrics, the majority ultimately concluded that the trial court properly weighed
that probative value with the lyrics’ danger to cause unfair prejudice given
“the close nexus between Mr. Montague’s rap lyrics and the murder.”160
Writing for the dissent, Judge Watts concluded that “the circuit court
abused its discretion” by admitting Montague’s lyrics into evidence because
“[t]he rap lyrics . . . bore no ‘close nexus’ (factual or temporal) to the crimes

154. Id. at 693, 243 A.3d at 567.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 694, 243 A.3d at 567.
157. See supra notes 44–45 and accompanying text.
158. Montague, 471 Md. at 697, 243 A.3d at 569–70 (citing State v. Skinner, 95 A.3d 236, 249
n.5 (N.J. 2014)).
159. Id. at 695, 243 A.3d at 568 (quoting Faulkner v. State, 468 Md. 418, 460, 227 A.3d 584,
608–09 (2020)); see also Williams v. State, 457 Md. 551, 563, 179 A.3d 1006, 1013 (2018) (first
citing Fuentes v. State, 454 Md. 296, 325, 164 A.3d 265, 282 (2017); then citing Alexis v. State,
437 Md. 457, 478, 87 A.3d 1243, 1254 (2014)) (“When the circuit court determines whether a piece
of evidence is relevant, that is a legal conclusion, which is reviewed without deference. However,
the circuit court’s decision to admit relevant evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. An
abuse of discretion occurs where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the circuit
court.”) (emphasis added).
160. Montague, 471 Md. at 697, 243 A.3d at 569. The majority reiterated that:
Such a nexus exists between the rap lyrics and Mr. Forrester’s murder because the lyrics
mirror details of the murder, were composed after the murder occurred, and included
“stop snitching” references that were published to potentially intimidate witnesses to the
murder. The existence of such a close nexus heightens the probative value of Mr.
Montague’s rap lyrics and diminishes the danger of unfair prejudice that may accompany
their admission.
Id.
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with which Montague was charged.”161 Judge Watts took particular issue
with the majority’s comparisons between the lyrics and the details of
Forrester’s murder.162 For instance, Judge Watts rejected the majority’s
conclusion that the first verse of Montague’s lyrics bore a factual similarity
to the events surrounding Forrester’s death.163 Moreover, according to Judge
Watts, “[t]here is nothing whatsoever about [the lyrics] that is related to the
receipt of counterfeit money,”164 the reference to “a .40” is “tenuous at best”
because “.40 is a common caliber of ammunition used in handguns,”165 and
“there is no connection in the lyrics between the ‘snitch’ and any person or
circumstances related to the case .”166
Alluding to the practical implications of the majority’s ruling, Judge
Watts further argued that the majority’s approach is “broader or more
permissive than that used in other jurisdictions and conflicts with [Hannah]”
because it permits the State to introduce highly inflammatory lyrics to jurors
with broad discretion rather than requiring a concrete connection between the
lyrics and alleged crime.167 According to Judge Watts, “[i]t is difficult to
imagine a more compelling case for abuse of discretion” than such an
unfettered decision to admit lyrics that tenuously relate to the details of an
alleged crime yet pose such a significant danger of unfair prejudice when
presented to a jury in light of their “generic references to violence.”168 Taken
together, Judge Watts ultimately concluded that the minimal probative value
of Montague’s lyrics was substantially outweighed by the risk that the lyrics
“would simply make the jury believe that Montague was a violent person.”169
IV. ANALYSIS
In Montague v. State, the Maryland Court of Appeals upheld a trial
court’s admission of defendant-authored rap lyrics into evidence because the
161. See id. at 699–700, 243 A.3d at 570–71 (Watts, J., dissenting) (“[I]ndeed, it is unclear when
the lyrics were even written—and [the lyrics] did nothing more than create the impression that
Montague was a person with a penchant for violence who was capable of murder.”).
162. See id. at 702, 243 A.3d at 572 (“In this case, a review of the rap lyrics at issue reveals that
the lyrics do not have a close factual nexus to the crimes charged, let alone an unmistakable factual
connection, and are nothing more than lyrics attendant to generic rap music.”).
163. See id. (“These lines [referring to the first verse] were disconnected from this case as the
victim was shot only in the torso, not in the head.”).
164. See id. at 703, 243 A.3d at 572–73 (referring to the following lines of Montague’s lyrics:
“if a n—-a ever play, treat his head like a target. You know he’s dead today”).
165. Id., 243 A.3d at 573 (quotations omitted).
166. See id. at 704, 243 A.3d at 573–74 (referring to the following lines of Montague’s lyrics:
“[I]f you ever play with me, I’ll give you a dream, a couple shots snitch”).
167. Id. at 699, 243 A.3d at 570.
168. Id. at 699, 707–08, 243 A.3d at 571, 575–76.
169. Id. at 707, 243 A.3d at 575. However, Judge Watts did concede that “there may arguably
be some parallels between the shooting and Montague’s rap lyrics.” Id.
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lyrics bore a “close factual and temporal nexus” to the alleged crime, and
because the lyrics were not unfairly prejudicial.170 Specifically, the Court of
Appeals held that lyrics recited by Lawrence Montague, while incarcerated
and awaiting trial, were admissible because they were probative of the details
of George Forrester’s murder.171 The Court of Appeals further held that the
lyrics were probative because they were composed roughly nine months after
the murder occurred.172 Attaching heightened probative value to the lyrics as
a result, the majority concluded that Montague’s lyrics were not unfairly
prejudicial because they bore such a close factual and temporal nexus to
Forrester’s murder.173
The Court of Appeals incorrectly decided the lyrics’ admissibility
because they were irrelevant, or bore no probative value, given their tenuous
connection to the underlying facts of the crime and replete references to
general themes.174 Additionally, even assuming that the lyrics bore any
probative value, the court incorrectly weighed the lyrics’ prejudicial impact
against such probative value given the inherent damaging effect that rap
lyrics have on jurors absent an unequivocal connection to the alleged
crime.175 Finally, the court’s holding failed to identify a clear standard for
analyzing rap lyrics’ admissibility moving forward, warranting discussion of
an appropriate standard that future courts, including the Court of Appeals,
should employ. Specifically, courts should utilize a tripartite framework that
includes authenticating the lyrics at issue, determining whether the lyrics are
unmistakably connected to the details of the alleged crime, and considering
whether less inherently prejudicial evidence is available.176
A. The Court Erred in Upholding the Admissibility of Montague’s
Lyrics Because They Were Irrelevant and Bore No Probative Value
The Montague majority acknowledged that the threshold requirement
for evidentiary relevance is a low bar to meet.177 Nevertheless, courts decline
to admit rap lyrics as relevant where they contain indirect or tenuous

170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

Id. at 667, 243 A.3d at 552 (majority opinion).
Id. at 673, 243 A.3d at 555.
Id. at 693, 243 A.3d at 567.
Id. at 697–98, 243 A.3d at 570.
See infra Section IV.A.
See infra Section IV.B.
See infra Section IV.C.
See Montague, 471 Md. at 674, 243 A.3d at 556.
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references to the alleged offense,178 and appellate courts owe no deference to
trial court determinations of relevance.179
The majority in Montague concluded that Montague’s lyrics were
relevant because they “b[ore] a close factual and temporal nexus to the details
of Mr. Forrester’s murder.”180 However, the majority’s comparison of the
lyrics and Forrester’s murder suffers from two flaws: the lyrics are either (1)
vague in their depictions of Forrester’s murder, or (2) identifiably different
from the events of the murder. As noted supra, the majority likens the first
verse of Montague’s lyrics to Forrester’s attempt to purchase cocaine with a
counterfeit bill, and Montague’s alleged violent reaction to that attempt.181
Not only do the lyrics contain no references to money, counterfeit or
otherwise, but the word “play” can be interpreted in an inconceivable number
of ways, including even trivial interpretations such as “a dispute about a
girlfriend, a parking space, or any [other] perceived slight.”182 Additionally,
the fact that Montague’s lyrics depict a violent reaction to any such perceived
slight is nothing more than an empirically identifiable common theme in rap
lyrics.183
The same can be said about the lyrics’ references to “snitches.” For
example, the majority concluded that the use of the word “snitches” was
meant to “potentially intimidate witnesses,” which further strengthened the

178. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 469 F. Supp. 3d 193, 221–22 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (agreeing
that defendant-authored rap lyrics had “no concrete connection to any charged activity in th[e] case,”
and finding that the lyrics were irrelevant because “the Government ha[d] not demonstrated that the
lyrics contain[ed] any direct references” to the charged offenses); United States v. Sneed, No. 3:14
CR 00159, 2016 WL 4191683, at *6 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 9, 2016) (finding that defendant-authored
rap lyrics were irrelevant and had “minimal (if any) probative value,” noting that “rapping about [a
crime] does not make it more likely that Defendant [] did, in fact, [commit that crime]”).
179. See Montague, 471 Md. at 673, 243 A.3d at 555 (citing Portillo Funes v. State, 469 Md.
438, 478, 230 A.3d 121, 144 (2020)) (“First, [appellate courts] consider whether the evidence is
legally relevant which is a conclusion of law that [appellate courts] review de novo.”).
180. Id. at 692, 243 A.3d at 566.
181. See supra notes 147–149 and accompanying text; see also Montague, 471 Md. at 670–71,
243 A.3d at 554 (referring to the following lyrics: “if a n—a ever play / Treat his head like a target
/ You know he’s dead today”).
182. Id. at 703, 243 A.3d at 573 (Watts, J. dissenting).
183. See Jordan v. State, 212 So. 3d 836, 858 (Miss. Ct. App. 2015) (Fair, J., dissenting)
(internal citation omitted) (citing Charis E. Kubrin, Gangstas, Thugs, and Hustlas: Identity and the
Code of the Street in Rap Music, 52 SOC. PROBS. 360, 369, 374 (2005)) (“Violence and retribution
are spectacularly common themes in rap music. In a survey of rap songs from albums with over
1,000,000 sales . . . one scholar found themes of violence in 65% of the songs, and violent retaliation
in 35%. . . . After reviewing more than 400 popular songs, she observed . . . ‘violent retaliation is
portrayed as punishment and is characterized as an acceptable and appropriate response as part of
the street code. In many instances violent retaliation is claimed to be not only appropriate but also
obligatory.’”); see generally Denise Herd, Changing Images of Violence in Rap Music Lyrics, 19791997, 30 J. PUB. HEALTH POL’Y 395 (2009) (describing the increase in both the level of violence in
rap lyrics and positive portrayals of such violence).
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factual nexus between Montague’s lyrics and Forrester’s murder.184 But as
Judge Watts pointed out in dissent, “[t]he State did not offer any evidence
that [Forrester] was a ‘snitch.’”185 Perceiving the use of the word “snitch” as
an attempt to intimidate Tasker, the State’s eye-witness and Forrester’s
cousin, is excessively broad and inferential because “nothing in the lyrics
referenced Tasker or any circumstance related to Montague’s alleged
encounter with Tasker while detained.”186 Moreover, general references to
“snitches” and discouraging “snitching” are not only widespread in rap
music, but are emerging central themes in rap music that have even sparked
a national social movement.187 Nor do Montague’s references to the number
“40” amount to specific details of Forrester’s murder given that .40 caliber
ammunition is one of the most common types of ammunition,188 and the
number “40” commonly refers to 40-ounce bottles of malt liquor in hip-hop
and rap lyrics.189
In addition to Montague’s lyrics being riddled with general rap themes,
the specific events depicted in Montague’s lyrics do not “describe details that
mirror the circumstances surrounding Mr. Forrester’s murder” as the
majority suggests.190 For instance, the lyrics reference shooting somebody in

184. Montague, 471 Md. at 673, 243 A.3d at 555 (majority opinion).
185. Id. at 704, 243 A.3d at 573 (Watts, J., dissenting).
186. Id.
187. See, e.g., Rachel A. Woldoff & Karen G. Weiss, Stop Snitchin’: Exploring Definitions of
The Snitch and Implications for Urban Black Communities, 17 UNIV. OF ALBANY, J. CRIM. JUST.
& POPULAR CULTURE 184, 190 (2010) (“Arguably, the anti-snitching message has emerged as a
central theme within hip-hop.”); Kubrin, supra note 183, at 374 (“Entire songs may be devoted to
warning others about the repercussions of snitching and testifying . . . .”); OFF. OF CMTY. ORIENTED
POLICING, U.S. DEP’T. OF JUST., THE STOP SNITCHING PHENOMENON: BREAKING THE CODE OF
SILENCE 23, 49 (2009), https://cops.usdoj.gov/RIC/Publications/cops-p158-pub.pdf (describing
that the anti-snitching sentiment and ensuing social movement is largely attributable to antisnitching references in music lyrics); Ladel Lewis, Stop Snitching: Hip Hop’s Influence on Crime
Reporting in the Inner City 11–12 (Apr. 2012) (Ph.D. dissertation, Western Michigan University),
https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1029&context=dissertations
(explaining that “hip hop music is perceived to be a catalyst for what many coin as the stop snitching
movement,” and that a central theme to hip-hop and rap music is “denouncing cooperation with the
authorities and reproving others that choose to do so”).
188. See Montague, 471 Md. at 671, 243 A.3d at 554 (referring to the following lyrics: “It’s a
.40 when that b—-h goin’ hit up s—t”); see also Ponce v. People, 72 V.I. 828, 858 (2020) (Swan,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that .40 caliber ammunition is “a common
caliber of ammunition used in handguns”); Miller v. Bonta, 542 F. Supp. 3d 1009, 1052 (S.D. Cal.
2021) (noting same); Justin George, Shoot to Kill: Why Baltimore Is One of the Most Lethal Cities
in the U.S., BALT. SUN (Sept. 30, 2016), https://data.baltimoresun.com/news/shoot-to-kill/
(“According to police, 9 mm and .40 caliber handguns and bullets are the most common types of
weapons used in crimes in Baltimore City.”).
189. Tim Scott, 40oz Beats: A Brief History of Malt Liquor in Hip Hop, VICE (Nov. 17, 2015,
4:15 PM), https://www.vice.com/en/article/rjxak4/40oz-beats-a-brief-history-of-malt-liquor-inhip-hop.
190. Montague, 471 Md. at 692, 243 A.3d at 566 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
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the head,191 yet Forrester’s assailant shot him in the back.192 Although the
lyrics arguably reference discharging a firearm four or five times,193 the
police recovered only two shell casings from the scene.194 Montague’s lyrics
include references to an ambulance and witnessing a dead body,195 but the
majority highlighted that Forrester’s assailant fled the scene, indicating that
the assailant would never see the ambulance or Forrester’s body.196
Additionally, as Judge Watt highlighted, “it is common sense to expect an
ambulance to show up at the scene of a shooting.”197 Finally, Montague’s
lyrics reference a pickup truck, whereas the majority identified that Forrester
arrived at the apartment complex in an SUV.198
These factual differences may seem hyper-specific, but they highlight
how Montague’s lyrics are easily distinguishable from lyrics in other cases
in which appellate courts upheld their admission. For instance, the defendant
in Greene v. Commonwealth expressly rapped in the first-person about
slicing an individual’s throat, whom he identified in the lyrics specifically as
his wife, with a knife in response to the defendant becoming angry when he
returned home.199 Identical to those lyrics, the State established that the
defendant came home from work, grew angry with his wife, then killed his
wife by slicing her throat.200 Additionally, in United States v. Stuckey, the
defendant was alleged to have shot an individual before rolling his body in
blankets and dumping the body in the street.201 Identical to that description,
the defendant’s lyrics detailed shooting an individual, rolling his body in
blankets, and dumping the body in the street.202 The lyrics at issue in
Montague are easily distinguishable from those in Greene and Stuckey, which
were nearly word-for-word restatements of the alleged crimes rather than
generic, broad references to violence and music themes. There are no such
191. In pertinent part, the lyrics contain the following lines: “Treat his head like a target / I’ll
pop your top like an orange peel.” Id. at 670–71, 243 A.3d at 554.
192. Id. at 668, 243 A.3d at 552.
193. See id. at 671, 243 A.3d at 554 (referring to the following lyrics: “4 or 5, rip up your body
quick”).
194. Id. at 669, 243 A.3d at 553. This detail is especially noteworthy given the facts of State v.
Skinner, where the court identified no sufficient factual nexus between the defendant’s lyrics, which
referenced shooting someone twice in the “mask” and six times in the ribs, and a victim being shot
three times in the back, once in the arm, once in the chest, once in the abdomen, and twice in the
head. 95 A.3d 236, 239, 251–52 (N.J. 2014).
195. See Montague, 471 Md. at 671, 243 A.3d at 554 (referring to the following lyrics: “You
getting picked up by the ambulance / You going to be dead on the spot”).
196. Id. at 668, 243 A.3d at 552.
197. Id. at 703–04, 243 A.3d at 573 (Watts, J., dissenting).
198. Id. at 667, 671, 243 A.3d at 552, 554 (majority opinion).
199. 197 S.W.3d 76, 85 (Ky. 2006).
200. Id. at 79–80.
201. 253 F. App’x 468, 474–75 (6th Cir. 2007).
202. Id. at 475.
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unequivocal factual connections between Montague’s lyrics and Forrester’s
murder that warrant viewing these cases similarly.203 Viewing the trial
court’s relevance conclusion de novo,204 the Court of Appeals erred in
holding that Montague’s lyrics were probative of the details of Forrester’s
murder and therefore relevant.
The majority in Montague also attached heightened probative value to
Montague’s lyrics because there was a close “temporal nexus between the
lyrics and the murder.”205 This conclusion is also flawed. The majority
asserts broadly that Montague wrote the lyrics while incarcerated after the
murder occurred,206 but “there is no evidence of when Montague composed
the rap lyrics.”207 The State demonstrated merely that the lyrics were
recorded the day Montague placed the phone call to the unidentified
individual.208 Even assuming that Montague’s lyrics were composed the very
day they were recorded, that occurred roughly nine months after Forrester’s
murder.209 This is a significant amount of time compared to cases in which
rap lyrics were admitted after courts were able to identify the date of their
creation, further shedding doubt on the probative value of Montague’s
lyrics.210 Rather, Montague’s lyrics are more akin to those at issue in cases
like State v. Skinner and United States v. Bey in this regard.211 Given that
Montague’s lyrics were saturated with general music themes, contained
specific details distinct from Forrester’s murder, and lacked a clear temporal
203. See supra notes 190–198 and accompanying text.
204. See supra note 61.
205. Montague v. State, 471 Md. 657, 676, 243 A.3d 546, 557 (2020).
206. Id. at 670, 243 A.3d at 553–54.
207. Id. at 705, 243 A.3d at 574 (Watts, J., dissenting).
208. See id. at 705–06, 243 A.3d at 574 (“There has been no admission attributed to Montague
that he composed the lyrics for the first time shortly after the charged offense or even while detained
awaiting trial, and there is no such evidence from any other witness. For all the majority opinion
reveals, Montague may have been working on the lyrics long before being charged with the offense
in this case.”).
209. Montague v. State, 244 Md. App. 24, 48, 222 A.3d 197, 211 (2019). Specifically, Forrester
was murdered on January 16, 2017, and “Montague recited his rap on October 7, 2017 . . . .” Id.
(emphasis added).
210. See, e.g., Greene v. Commonwealth, 197 S.W.3d 76, 86 (Ky. 2006) (affirming admission
of rap video “shot days after the [crime]”); Commonwealth v. Talbert, 129 A.3d 536, 537, 540 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 2015) (affirming admission of lyrics recorded forty-two days after the crime); United
States v. Wilson, 493 F. Supp. 2d 484, 490 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (affirming admission of lyrics “written
in the two days following the [crimes]”). This is also significantly different from the temporal
connection Maryland courts have identified in admitting rap lyrics in unreported cases. See supra
note 51.
211. See United States v. Bey, No. CR 16-290, 2017 WL 1547006, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 28, 2017)
(declining to admit rap videos and lyrics, noting that “the probative value of the rap videos and
lyrics is further undercut by the fact that they are undated, so there is no indication as to whether
[the defendant] created the lyrics close in time to the date of his arrest” or the alleged crime); State
v. Skinner, 95 A.3d 236, 240 (N.J. 2014) (reversing trial court’s admission of rap lyrics, noting “it
is not clear when each individual verse of the lyrics found in defendant’s notebooks was written”).
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connection to Forrester’s murder, they were irrelevant and bore no probative
value. Coupled with the fact that the trial court’s relevance determination
was owed no deference, the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the
admission of Montague’s lyrics by deeming them relevant.
B. The Court Erred in Upholding the Admission of Montague’s Lyrics
Because Any Potential Probative Value of Montague’s Lyrics Was
Substantially Outweighed by Their Inherent Prejudicial Effects
Even if Montague’s lyrics bore probative value sufficient to meet the
threshold requirement for relevancy, the Court of Appeals erred in weighing
such probative value against the danger of unfair prejudice associated with
admitting Montague’s lyrics. Specifically, the majority did not sufficiently
consider the inherently prejudicial and damaging effect that admitting
violent, fictional lyrics—like Montague’s—has on jurors in light of their
minimal probative value.
Although the majority recognized “the inherent risk of unfair prejudice
that accompanies admitting a defendant’s rap lyrics as substantive evidence
of their guilt,” it failed to appreciate the full extent to which this occurs.212
Psychologists have explored this phenomenon by studying “the biasing
effects of gangsta’ rap lyrics” on juror’s subjective perceptions of defendants
tried specifically for murder.213 In one study, prospective jurors were split
into four control groups and provided differing biographical information
regarding a “target male,” named Offord Rollins, who was the defendant in
an actual murder case.214 Certain control groups were presented with rap
lyrics that Rollins coauthored, which the prosecution sought to admit as
evidence during Rollins’ trial.215 The study was conducted as follows:
Condition 1 identifies the Target Male as an eighteen-year-old
African American male high school student-athlete who has a good
academic record and is planning on attending college on an athletic
scholarship. Condition 2 contains the same facts as Condition 1,
but mentions that the Target Male had been accused of murder.
212. Montague, 471 Md. at 687, 243 A.3d at 563.
213. Stuart P. Fischoff, Gangsta’ Rap and a Murder in Bakersfield, 29 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCH.
795, 795 (1999).
214. Id. at 798–800.
215. Id. at 799. The lyrics were as follows:
Id die before my d—k starts to fizz / pulled it out and my head smelled like fish / rush to
the shower to wash my d—k / Let me go, Let me go / B—-h let me go / She wouldn’t let
me go So I slapped the h- / don’t get mad You fruit cocktail / See my rhymes Now you
happy like a f-g in jail / sayin my name wrong you trick silly rabbit / come in my face
again I’m gonta grab it / So watch your chains and Nugget cause with the Steel in my
hand I’m ruggit / put the guard up for your gold teeth you littel fink / talk one more line
then I’m a sluggit.
Id. at 800.
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There was no mention of the rap lyrics in Condition 2. Under
Condition 3, the Target Male was not accused of murder, but the
participants in the experiment received lyrics that were alleged to
have been written by the Target Male. Under Condition 4, the final
condition group, the Target Male was both accused of
murder and alleged to have written a certain set of rap lyrics.
After receiving their assigned condition group, the participants
were surveyed on their impressions of the respective Target Male
by completing a series of nine adjective scales, labeled 1-6. The
nine bipolar adjective scales to which the participants responded
were: caring-uncaring, selfish-unselfish, gentle-rough, likableunlikable, conceited-modest, truthful-untruthful, sexually
nonaggressive-sexually aggressive, capable of murder-not capable
of murder, and not a gang member-a gang member.216
Analyzing the ensuing surveys, the “results clearly indicate[d] that
showing participants the rap lyrics exerted a significant prejudicial impact on
the evaluation of a person, and particularly so when the person has been
accused of murder.”217 Even within the control groups where Rollins was
not accused of murder, “[t]he study further revealed that potential jurors were
significantly inclined to judge a gangsta rap lyricist not accused of murder
more harshly and with more disdain than a non-gangsta rapper who was
accused of murder.”218 One possible explanation for these findings is that
“more times than not, the judge and a majority of the jury are going to be
people who are not [rap] aficionados, and therefore will be more likely to
take offense to [the] lyrics.”219 Another possibility is that “certain subtypes
of rap and hip-hop often incorporate fictional or grossly exaggerated claims
of toughness and violence,” resulting in juries likening lyrics to false
confessions as if they were “auto-biographical accounts of real-world
events.”220 This is especially problematic because “confessions have
216. See Dre’Kevius O. Huff, Rap on Trial: The Case for Nonliteral Interpretation of Rap
Lyrics, 5 Savannah L. Rev. 335, 344 (2018) (citations omitted) (summarizing Fischoff, supra note
213). “The sample size of ‘jurors’ consisted of 134 individuals representative of a broad crosssection of the community, ranging from 18 to 56 years of age, with a mean age of 27.6 years; the
sample size also included participants of the Asian, White, Black, and Hispanic races.” Id. at 343–
44.
217. See Fischoff, supra note 213, at 803 (emphasis added).
218. Holmes v. State, 306 P.3d 415, 424 (Nev. 2013) (Saitta, J., dissenting) (emphasis in
original) (citations omitted).
219. Jason E. Powell, R.A.P.: Rule Against Perps (Who Writes Rhymes), 41 RUTGERS L.J. 479,
494 (2009).
220. Erin Lutes et. al., When Music Takes the Stand: A Content Analysis of How Courts Use and
Misuse Rap Lyrics in Criminal Cases, 46 AM. J. CRIM. L. 77, 130 (2019). Similarly, some argue
that jurors are often unable to distinguish “the writer from the speaker” when reading lyrics written
in the first-person, causing jurors to view “artistic narratives as written confessions.” Luke Walls,
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profound impact on [juries]” given that a “defendant’s own confession is
probably the most probative and damaging evidence that can be admitted
against him.”221 Regardless of the reason, though, research in this area
“suggests that rap lyrics are extremely prejudicial and not particularly
probative.”222 Numerous additional studies, as recent as 2018, have
confirmed the inherent negative psychological criticisms associated with rap
music, particularly violent rap and hip-hop music written by Black artists.223
Courts across the nation have similarly identified the inherent
prejudicial and damming impact that rap lyrics have on jurors, particularly
when the lyrics do not unambiguously depict the details of an alleged
crime.224 For instance, in United States v. Williams,225 the United States
District Court for the Northern District of California declined to admit
“ambiguous lyrics” and videos that were violent and denigrating.226
Specifically, the court noted that the lyrics’ violent and offensive nature made
them “highly inflammatory,” making it “undeniable” that they “may arouse
an emotional response, evoke a sense of horror, or appeal to an instinct to
punish” regardless of whether the defendant actually committed the alleged
crime.227 In State v. Leslie,228 the Court of Appeals of Iowa affirmed the
exclusion of defendant-authored rap lyrics, stressing that “rap lyrics
frequently contain stereotypical images and themes that have negative

Rapp Snitch Knishes: The Danger of Using Gangster Rap Lyrics to Prove Defendants’ Character,
48 SW. L. REV. 173, 184–85 (2019).
221. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 296 (1991) (quoting Bruton v. United States, 391
U.S. 123, 139–40 (1968) (White, J., dissenting)).
222. Michael Gregory, Murder Was the Case That They Gave Me: Defendant’s Rap Lyrics As
Evidence in A Criminal Trial, 25 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 329, 354 (2016).
223. See generally Carrie B. Fried, Bad Rap for Rap: Bias in Reactions to Music Lyrics, 26 J.
APPLIED SOC. PSYCH. 2135 (1996) (finding that people judge lyrics significantly harsher when they
are associated with the rap genre, Black artists, or both); Adam Dunbar, et. al., The Threatening
Nature of “Rap” Lyrics, 22 PSYCH. PUB. POL’Y & L. 280 (2016) (replicating Fried’s study, finding
that merely associating lyrics with the rap genre may influence jurors’ decisions regardless of their
actual content); Adam Dunbar & Charis E. Kubrin, Imagining Violent Criminals: An Experimental
Investigation of Music Stereotypes and Character Judgments, 14 J. EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY
507 (2018) (finding that individuals attach heightened criminal propensity to people associated with
violent rap lyrics); see also ERIK NIELSON & ANDREA L. DENNIS, RAP ON TRIAL: RACE, LYRICS,
AND GUILT IN AMERICA 92 (2019) (surveying studies to conclude that individuals associated with
“rap music [are] more likely to be described as threats to society”); KATHERYN RUSSELL-BROWN,
UNDERGROUND CODES: RACE, CRIME, AND RELATED FIRES 52–54 (2004) (explaining that rap
music is largely conflated with a causal relationship to criminal activity).
224. See generally, e.g., United States v. Williams, No. 3:13-cr-00764-WHO-1, 2017 WL
4310712 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2017); State v. Leslie, No. 12–1335, 2014 WL 70259 (Iowa Ct. App.
Jan. 9, 2014).
225. No. 3:13-cr-00764-WHO-1, 2017 WL 4310712 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2017).
226. Id. at *7.
227. Id.
228. No. 12–1335, 2014 WL 70259 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 9, 2014).
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associations.”229 Combined with the lyrics’ lack of probative value given
their dissimilarity with the alleged offense, the court concluded that “the
presentation of the rap [lyrics] would have been unduly prejudicial.”230
Most notably for the context of this Note, though, appellate courts have
found the admission of vague, violent-laced lyrics to be improper—and thus
an abuse of discretion—where they bear minimal probative value despite
risking substantial unfair prejudice.231 In State v. Skinner, the Supreme Court
of New Jersey reversed the admission of defendant-authored lyrics because
they effectively “poison[ed] the jury against [the] defendant.”232 The court
emphasized that the lyrics at issue bore minimal probative value because they
did not constitute “direct evidence of the offense,” yet were violent,
degrading, and glorified criminal activity and thus were likely to improperly
influence jurors.233 Similarly in Commonwealth v. Gray,234 the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the admission of defendantauthored rap videos and lyrics constituted prejudicial error.235 Specifically,
the court concluded that the inherent prejudicial impact that the violent,
profane lyrics had on jurors “far outweighed” the lyrics’ minimal probative
value because “[t]he lyrics show[ed] no connection to the defendant that
would suggest they were biographical or otherwise indicative” of the
defendant’s involvement in the crime.236
Although deciding whether a trial court erred in admitting relevant
evidence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard, courts have
repeatedly found error in the admission of rap lyrics where they pose a
substantial risk of biasing jurors without unequivocally matching the details
of the charged offense.237 Montague’s lyrics should have been no exception.
The Court of Appeals recognized that “[t]he danger of unfair prejudice [in
the context of rap lyrics] is of particular concern when a defendant’s rap lyrics
are ‘insufficiently tethered’ to the details of the alleged crime,” but found that
such unfair prejudice did not exist because there was a strong connection
between the lyrics and Forrester’s death.238 However, as described supra,
Montague’s lyrics bore minimal, if any, probative value given their
229. Id. at *6 (citation omitted).
230. Id.
231. See supra notes 93 and 98 and accompanying text; see also infra text accompanying notes
232–236.
232. 95 A.3d 236, 249 (N.J. 2014).
233. Id. at 250.
234. 978 N.E.2d 543 (Mass. 2012)
235. Id. at 562.
236. Id. at 560–62.
237. See generally Greene v. Commonwealth, 197 S.W.3d 76 (Ky. 2006); Binimow, supra note
140 (collecting cases).
238. Montague v. State, 471 Md. 657, 687, 243 A.3d 546, 563 (2020).
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thematically general and tenuous factual and temporal relationship with
Forrester’s murder—there was no strong connection.239 Compounded by the
proven detrimental impact that accompanies the admission of inflammatory
lyrics like Montague’s, the Court of Appeals incorrectly weighed the
probative value of Montague’s lyrics against their prejudicial effects. The
court therefore erred in affirming the admission of Montague’s lyrics.
C. Analyzing Rap Lyrics’ Admissibility Should Include Authenticating
the Lyrics, Evaluating Whether They Bear an Unmistakable
Factual Connection to the Alleged Crime, and Considering
Whether Less Prejudicial Evidence Is Available
The majority opinion in Montague provides no clear standard for
analyzing the admissibility of defendant-authored lyrics in criminal trials
moving forward.240 This is understandable considering that Montague is only
the second published case in Maryland to analyze the admissibility of rap
lyrics. More specifically, the majority produced no discernible standard for
properly balancing lyrics’ probative value with their danger to unfairly
prejudice jurors. One potential remedy to mitigate lyrics’ inflammatory
impact on jurors is to require limiting instructions241 when presenting jurors
with rap lyrics.242 However, this solution is unlikely to reduce the inherent
prejudicial effects that accompany the admission of inflammatory lyrics—“A
juror who does not believe that a defendant’s words are art [or fiction] is not
more likely to believe they are art [or fiction] simply because a judge says
that they might be.”243 Especially considering the proven psychological
impact that inflammatory lyrics have on jurors, it is highly doubtful that
jurors will be able to nullify their inherent biases simply because a judge
instructs them to do so.244
239. See supra Section IV.A.
240. See Huff, supra note 216, at 337 (“[I]n recent years, courts have begun using . . . rap lyrics
as damning evidence in criminal trials.”).
241. See Fullbright v. State, 168 Md. App. 168, 185, 895 A.2d 1088, 1097 (2006) (quotation
omitted) (“[L]imiting instructions are given during trial when there is a danger that jurors will be
exposed to information they should not consider, and/or that the jurors might make improper use of
the information they have been exposed to.”).
242. See Gomez v. Ducart, No. CV 14-04911-PSG (DTB), 2015 WL 9920809, at *6 (C.D. Cal.
Oct. 21, 2015), R. & R. adopted, No. CV 14-04911-PSG (DTB), 2016 WL 354860 (C.D. Cal. Jan.
26, 2016) (finding rap lyrics were admissible in part because they were accompanied by a limiting
instruction explaining the specific purpose for which they were admitted)
243. Gregory, supra note 222, at 355–56. Some litigants even argue that limiting instructions
are counterproductive and increase the likelihood that a jury will decline to follow them. See DeHart
v. State, No. 20A-PC-2277, 2021 WL 4258823, at *14 (Ind. Ct. App. Sept. 20, 2021) (“[L]imiting
instructions say hey, don’t, don’t scratch your nose and then people just start scratching their nose.”).
But see CSX Transp., Inc. v. Hensley, 556 U.S. 838, 841 (2009) (citing Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S.
756, 766 n.8 (1987)) (“[J]uries are presumed to follow the court’s instructions.”).
244. See supra notes 213–223 and accompanying text.
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Rather, moving forward, courts should develop and follow a more
defined standard to analyze the admissibility of defendant-authored rap lyrics
in criminal prosecutions when confronted with such lyrics to minimize their
inherent prejudicial effect. First, courts should authenticate lyrics as having
been written or created by the defendant against which the lyrics will be used
to prove guilt of an alleged offense.245 In other words, courts should require
prosecutors to introduce evidence sufficient to establish, under the specific
circumstances of each case, that the lyrics in question were in fact written by
the defendant, rather than having been written by any other individual.246
Although this was not at issue in Montague, this requirement would narrow
the type of lyrics that may be used as substantive evidence of guilt and ensure
that there is a baseline concrete connection between the lyrics and a
defendant.
Next, courts should adopt and follow State v. Skinner’s “unmistakable
factual connection” approach to determining the admissibility of rap lyrics.247
To effectively mitigate the inherent prejudice that accompanies the admission
of rap lyrics, courts must make certain that the lyrics at issue have a “strong
nexus between specific details of the artistic composition and the
circumstances of the offense for which the evidence is being adduced.”248 As
Skinner demonstrates, this “strong nexus” is not satisfied when lyrics are
riddled with general themes or do not depict the specific facts of an alleged
crime.249 Finding that a strong nexus exists between vague lyrics and an
alleged crime undercuts this approach and has the potential to result in the
improper admission of inflammatory lyrics, as was the case in Montague.250
Rather, the lyrics must exhibit an “unmistakable factual connection to the
charged crimes” in order to bear a strong nexus.251 Not only would this
approach more clearly define the scope of admissible lyrics, but it also
245. Lutes, supra note 220, at 130.
246. See Sublet v. State, 442 Md. 632, 666, 113 A.3d 695, 715 (2015) (quoting United States v.
Vayner, 769 F.3d 125, 130 (2d Cir. 2014)) (“[D]etermination[s] of authentication must be made by
the trial judge and ‘depends upon a context-specific determination whether the proof advanced is
sufficient to support a finding that the item in question is what its proponent claims it to be’, based
upon ‘sufficient proof . . . so that a reasonable juror could find in favor of authenticity or
identification.’”); see also id. at 667, 113 A.3d at 715 (quoting United States v. Al-Moayad, 545
F.3d 139, 172 (2d Cir. 2008)) (“The ‘proof of authentication may be direct or circumstantial.’”);
MD. R. 5-901(a) (“The requirement of authentication or identification as a condition precedent to
admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is
what its proponent claims.”); FED. R. EVID. 901 (“To satisfy the requirement of authenticating or
identifying an item of evidence, the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a finding
that the item is what the proponent claims it is.”).
247. State v. Skinner, 95 A.3d 236, 252 (N.J. 2014).
248. Id. at 251–52.
249. Id. at 252.
250. See supra Sections IV.A and IV.B.
251. Skinner, 95 A.3d at 252 (emphasis added).
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“protects lyrics from being admitted where their impact would be detrimental
to the defendant, and do not further a logical, permissible inference to the
likelihood of an element of a crime.”252
Finally, even if such a strong nexus exists based on an unmistakable
factual connection, courts still must consider whether the admission of the
lyrics at issue is necessary to prove the alleged crime. This would deter
judges from needlessly admitting inflammatory lyrics where other evidence
may prove the same contentions, but also forces prosecutors to examine
whether less prejudicial evidence is available without having to admit such
lyrics that inherently prejudice jurors. This restriction on the admissibility of
rap lyrics was emphasized in Skinner,253 and various courts have guided their
evidentiary decisions on this basis post-Skinner.254
Applying this specific requirement to Montague further demonstrates
that the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the admission of Montague’s
lyrics. The State’s theory in Montague could have been established through
Tasker’s eyewitness testimony and the physical evidence recovered at the
scene of the murder.255 The jury would then have been able to weigh Tasker’s
testimony and the physical evidence in assessing Montague’s guilt without
being presented with Montague’s inherently prejudicial lyrics. Put simply,
courts should conduct a searching, careful analysis when deciding whether to
admit or uphold the admission of defendant-authored rap lyrics in the context
of criminal trials. Such an analysis should include authenticating that the
lyrics at issue were written by the defendant, comparing the lyrics and the
alleged crime for an unmistakable factual connection, and considering
whether less inherently prejudicial evidence is available.256 This tripartite
framework would ensure that there is a sufficient connection between lyrics
and a defendant to warrant associating them together, but also limits the
ability of prosecutors to offer, as well as judges to admit, forms of evidence
252. Gregory, supra note 222, at 356.
253. See Skinner, 95 A.3d at 253 (noting that “[l]ess prejudicial evidence was available to the
State”).
254. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Gibson, No. 2788 EDA 2014, 2015 WL 6662911, at *6 (Pa.
Super. Ct. Oct. 30, 2015) (excluding rap lyrics on the ground that they were “unnecessary to prove
the Commonwealth’s case” because “there were purported eyewitnesses to the charged offenses and
police recovered physical evidence” that could be relied upon with less prejudicial effect); see also
State v. Scurry, No. A-0377-18T1, 2020 WL 6074133, at *5 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Oct. 15,
2020) (noting that the admission of rap video and lyrics may be unnecessary where “the State had
significant other evidence available to prove its case”). This approach is further consistent with the
notion that “If an alternative [piece of evidence] were found to have substantially the same or greater
probative value but a lower danger of unfair prejudice, sound judicial discretion would discount the
value of the item first offered and exclude it if its discounted probative value were substantially
outweighed by unfairly prejudicial risk.” Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 182–83 (1997).
255. The Court of Special Appeals emphasized the importance of Tasker’s eyewitness testimony
at length. See generally Montague v. State, 244 Md. App. 24, 222 A.3d 197 (2019).
256. See supra notes 245–254 and accompanying text.
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that are inherently extremely prejudicial and unlikely to possess probative
value.
V. CONCLUSION
In Montague v. State, the Maryland Court of Appeals upheld the
admission of defendant-authored rap lyrics into evidence during a murder
trial on the ground that the lyrics retained heightened probative value given
their factual and temporal connection to the murder.257 Moreover, the
majority held that the lyrics were not unduly prejudicial because the lyrics
retained such a heightened probative value.258 The Court of Appeals
incorrectly decided this issue, as Montague’s lyrics were irrelevant given
their vague, ambiguous language that was identifiably distinct from the
details of the murder.259 Additionally, the Court of Appeals erred in holding
that the lyrics were not substantially outweighed by a danger of unfair
prejudice because the court failed to properly balance the minimal (if any)
probative value of Montague’s lyrics with the inherent psychological and
damming effects that violent lyrics have on jurors.260
Finally, the Court of Appeals failed to provide a clear standard for
balancing lyrics’ probative value with their inherent prejudicial impacts when
offered as evidence in criminal trials.261 This warrants discussion of potential
approaches to analyzing the admissibility of such lyrics moving forward.
Specifically, this Note argues that one viable approach includes
authenticating the lyrics’ author, comparing the lyrics and the alleged crime
for an unmistakable factual connection, and evaluating whether less
inherently prejudicial evidence is available.262

257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.

471 Md. 657, 667, 243 A.3d 546, 552 (2020).
Id.
See supra Section IV.A.
See supra Section IV.B.
See supra Section IV.C.
See supra Section IV.C.

